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The use of arms transfers1 to achieve political ends has long been a
major feature of American foreign policy. Although the Iran-Contra Af-
fair' is the most recent and most prominent example of this practice, arms
transfers have been relied upon by every postwar administration to
achieve political ends.3 However, while arms transfers have been a con-
stant feature of American foreign policy, the form of arms exports has
changed over the decades from military aid packages in the 1950's and
1960's to sales in the 1970's and 1980's.' This shift has led to a decreased
1. The term "arms transfers" refers to the provision of non-nuclear combat equipment, spare
parts, ammunition, and support services by outright grant or by sale. A foreign government wishing to
procure American-manufactured arms may receive them in three ways. First, if received as part of a
foreign aid package, the arms are paid for with funds appropriated by Congress under the Military
Assistance Program. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2311-2322 (1979 & Supp. 1988). Congress can directly
control such transfers through its appropriation power. Second, a foreign government wishing to
purchase arms may initiate discussions with the United States government under the Foreign Military
Sales Program. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2761-2770a (1979 & Supp. 1988). In this case, the United States
government acts as an agent for the sale, buying the arms from American manufacturers and reselling
them to foreign governments. Under this program, loans may also be made available to some foreign
governments to cover the purchase price. Third, a foreign government may seek to buy arms directly
from an American manufacturer in a commercial sale. Such sales involve the United States govern-
ment only in the issuance of an export license. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (1979 & Supp. 1988). In the
latter two cases, under the current state of the law, Congress can only register disapproval of a pend-
ing sale late in the process, when negotiations have been completed. For a complete description of the
decision-making processes involved in each type of sale, see P. HAMMOND, D. LOUSCHER, M. SALO-
MONE & N. GRAHAM, THE RELUCTANT SUPPLIER 83-124 (1983) [hereinafter RELUCTANT
SUPPLIER].
2. See generally PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD, THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT
(1987). See also Scheffer, U.S. Law and the Iran-Contra Affair, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 696, 698-713
(1987) (describing legal requirements not followed by Reagan Administration pertaining to sale of
arms).
3. Many commentators have described the use of military assistance and arms sales by successive
administrations to accomplish foreign policy goals. See, e.g., RELUCTANT SUPPLIER, supra note 1, at
59-203; R. LABRIE, J. HUTCHINS, E. PEURA & D. RICHMAN, U.S. ARMS SALES POLICY 5-24
(1982) [hereinafter ARMS SALES POLICY]; A. COrrTRELL, R. HANKS & M. MOODIE, ARMS TRANS-
FERS AND U.S. FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY 13-25 (1980).
4. Immediately after World War II, the bulk of American arms exports went to European allies.
Later, as the foreign policy of containment led to American commitments in far-flung regions, such as
Southeast Asia, military aid to these areas increased as well. ARMS SALES POLICY, supra note 3, at
6-7. By the late 1960's, the market for arms increased dramatically as developing countries sought to
build military capacity. This trend led Congress to pass the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1322 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2751-2796 (1979 & Supp.
1988)), which established a formal procedure for cash and credit sales, but left decision-making
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role for Congress in monitoring arms exports and has increased congres-
sional-executive tension over the issue of arms sales.5 This longstanding
tension-laid bare by the Iran-Contra Affair-will only increase as the
United States continues to sell arms and Congress continues to demand an
active role in setting the foreign policy agenda.'
This Note examines the methods Congress has previously employed to
assert its role in the area of arms sales and then proposes a new, more
effective control mechanism. The most recent congressional attempt to sys-
tematically monitor arms sales came in the early 1970's." Concerned that
unregulated transfers had contributed to dangerously extensive foreign
policy commitments like those in Southeast Asia, Congress passed compre-
hensive legislation in 1976 that was aimed at increasing its role in the
arms transfer process.8 A crucial element of the new system was a number
largely to the discretion of the executive branch. ARMS SALES POLICY, supra note 3, at 8-9. Faced
with an increasing demand for arms, especially from the oil-rich developing countries, the Nixon and
Ford Administrations sold arms to most willing buyers. Charges that arms exports were "out of
control" led Congress to pass the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified as amended 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 2751-2796 (1979 &
Supp. 1988))(hereinafter AECA). See infra text accompanying notes 38-44. This legislation at-
tempted to force executive branch restraint in sales by both strong policy language and procedural
controls involving Congress. Concurrently, President Carter agreed to make arms sales an "excep-
tional tool" of foreign policy. ARMS SALES POLICY, supra note 3, at 10. However, arms sales contin-
ued unabated during his administration and the legislative restraint proved largely ineffective. Id. at
11; SENATE DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., 98TH CONG., 1sT SEss., AN UNCONVENTIONAL ARMS
POLICY: SELLING OURSELVES SHORT 8-9 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter 1983 SENATE REPORT].
Early on, the Reagan Administration committed itself to a "flexible approach," making it clear that
arms sales would play an active role in its foreign policy agenda. ARMS SALES POLICY, supra note 3,
at 15-18; 1983 SENATE REPORT, supra, at 17-18 (criticizing Reagan Administration's case-by-case
approach to arms transfers and concomitant increase in sales volume).
5. This tension has been particularly pronounced during President Reagan's two terms because
his administration has demonstrated little effort to comply with the mandate of restraint in arms sales
set out in the AECA. See 1983 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-17 (documenting Reagan
Administration flouting AECA policy guidelines).
6. While analysts argue over the rate at which arms sales have been increasing since the early
1970's, see RELUCTANT SUPPLIER, supra note 1, at 12 (discussing disagreement over terms of mea-
surement), none argues that the volume of sales is likely to decrease in the near future. A coherent
arms sales policy is critical given that demand for arms is not likely to abate in the near future.
Unlike the pre-1970's period, when developing countries would gladly accept American weapons sys-
tems that were dated or obsolete, developing countries now seek state-of-the-art systems, even at the
risk of incurring substantial debt burdens. 1983 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 19-20. While the
countries of the Middle East will probably continue to be the biggest buyers in the near future, sub-
Saharan Africa is the fastest growing market. Id. at 21. Other buyers include South American and
Southeast Asian countries. Id. at 22-26.
7. See supra note 4. The assertion of a more active congressional role in foreign affairs in the
wake of Vietnam and Watergate has been discussed by many commentators. See, e.g., T. FRANCK &
E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS (1979); THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY (T. Franck ed.
1981); L. FISCHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER (1987). The increasing number of procedures
the executive branch must follow when acting in foreign affairs provides clear evidence of this trend.
See Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1191 (1986) (describing growing use of procedures in trade legislation);
Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 69 (1988) (same for aid
legislation); see also Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 284, 299-306
(1987) (arguing for continued congressional assertion of more central role in foreign policymaking by
reliance on variety of procedures).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 38-44. In addition to increased congressional oversight over
arms sales, Congress included in the AECA policy statements calling for the exercise of restraint in
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of legislative vetoes which allowed Congress to police executive branch
decisionmaking.9 In 1983, the Supreme Court held the legislative veto
procedure unconstitutional,1" leaving Congress to fall back on ad hoc solu-
tions, such as "report and wait" periods, to preserve its role in foreign
affairs policymaking. 12 Congressional participation is particularly impor-
tant in the arms sales area if the legislative branch is to influence the
executive branch in setting foreign policy goals, such as a more or less
aggressive arms sales policy.'
arms sales. See 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1982).
9. The term "legislative veto" refers to statutory provisions that allow a committee of one or both
Houses of Congress to "veto" executive actions taken under broadly delegated authority-that is, to
disallow presidential action, usually by a majority or two-thirds vote. In 1983, when the Supreme
Court declared the procedure unconstitutional, legislative vetoes were present in most statutes delegat-
ing authority to the President for the conduct of foreign affairs. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
1004-14 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (cataloguing legislative veto provisions in statutes dealing with
foreign aid, trade, arms sales, war powers and emergency powers); see also Koh, supra note 7, at
1207 (legislative veto had become "congressional control method of choice in the foreign affairs
realm"); Gilmour & Craig, After the Congressional Veto: Assessing the Alternatives, 3 J. PoL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 373, 374 (1984) (same). Although no presidential initiatives in foreign affairs
were actually challenged by a veto resolution, id., the procedure did exert pressure on executive
branch policymaking and its demise provoked congressional hearings and much commentary; see, e.g.,
infra note 47. Even if it were still a viable option, the legislative veto would not address the problem
of congressional participation as well as the fast-track guarantee procedure; see infra Section II.
10. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Congress cannot accomplish legislative action with-
out fulfilling constitutional requirements of presentment and bicameralism).
11. See text accompanying notes 46-49.
12. Many commentators have argued that no all-purpose substitute for the legislative veto is
available. See, e.g., Gilmour & Craig, supra note 9 (discussing possible substitutes). But see Breyer,
The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785 (1984) (proposing single substitute procedure).
Congress has chosen to adjust statutes containing legislative vetoes on a case-by-case basis, HOUSE
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 1983, at
137 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1983 HousE REPORT], and has chosen to rely on such devices
as durational limits on authorization, reporting provisions and consultation requirements. Id. at
136-37. The former two devices are cumbersome and the latter often proves ineffective without some
other incentive for compliance like a guarantee of expedited treatment. See generally Franck & Bob,
The Return of Hump,-Dumpty: Foreign Relations After the Chadha Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 912
(1985); see also Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, 97 YALE L.J.
1255, 1301 (1988) (arguing that only effective supervisory methods in foreign affairs legislation have
been legislative veto and appropriations cutoff). For thorough analyses of the efficacy of procedural
mechanisms relied upon by Congress in specific areas, see Koh, supra note 7, at 1204-07 (devices
used in Trade Act of 1974 and subsequent trade legislation include specific negotiating objectives,
"sunset" provisions, and extensive consultation and reporting requirements); Meyer, supra note 7, at
83-85, 94-95 (devices in foreign assistance statutes include objective definitional standards, reporting
and consultation requirements, shortened authorization periods, independent congressional fact-
finding bodies, and expedited legislative procedures).
13. Among academic commentators, as well as members of the political branches of government,
there is a significant difference of opinion as to what role arms transfers should play in American
foreign policy. For example, many agree with former Secretary of State Kissinger that arms transfers
stabilize regional balances and are a primary tool of "conflict control." See Moose & Siegel, Congress
and Arms Transfers, in ARMS TRANSFERS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 228, 254-60 (A. Pierre
ed. 1979); 1983 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11-14 (Reagan administration view that volume of
arms sales to developing countries is vital index of American/Soviet competition). Others feel a strong
uneasiness about the United States role as one of the world's foremost supplier of arms and hope that
the United States will take a stronger stance on the multilateral restraint of arms sales. Id. at 5
(discussing potential for escalation of conflict into nuclear confrontation). Other factors that may enter
the decision on a given sale include whether the weapons at issue have nuclear capability, whether
importation of sophisticated weapons will disturb a regional military balance, whether purchase will
increase the debt burden or significantly sap development resources, and whether the risk that the
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Against this backdrop of repeated failure to find a meaningful substi-
tute for the legislative veto, this Note examines a procedure-developed to
ensure more extensive congressional participation in the negotiation of
trade agreements-that may strengthen Congress' ability to regulate arms
transfers. The procedure, the "fast-track guarantee," allows the executive
and legislative branches to strike a bargain: If the executive branch seeks
congressional approval of its negotiating agenda early in the negotiation
process, Congress will guarantee expedited treatment of any legislation
necessary to validate the agreement. 14 In the future, the procedure may
enable Congress to exert greater control over executive action in other
foreign affairs areas, specifically those areas where negotiation of execu-
tive agreements remains a crucial and unregulated part of policy
implementation. 5
This Note argues that Congress cannot play a meaningful role in af-
fecting executive branch negotiations unless the President is forced to con-
sult with congressional committees early in the process. Experience from
the trade area indicates that the fast-track guarantee procedure, used at
the pre-negotiation stage, will provide the executive branch with the nec-
essary incentives to ensure such consultation. It provides both a legal con-
straint and a means of power-sharing that balances the policy needs of
both branches.
Section I describes the constitutional scope of each branch's power to
exercise control over arms transfers and reviews the three legislative re-
gimes that have structured congressional-executive participation in this
area to date. Section II then reviews the fast-track guarantee procedure as
developed in the trade area. The potential application of a similar proce-
dure to ensure a greater congressional role in the negotiation of arms sales
is examined in Section III and some suggestions are made for potential
use of the procedure in other areas.
weapons will fall into unfriendly hands is worth allowing the deal to go through. Warnke & Luck,
American Arms Transfers: Policy and Process in the Executive Branch, in ARMS TRANSFERS AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICy, supra, at 207-09; 1983 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. Including
Congress in the debate on both the questions of which specific sales the United States should make
and what its broader sales policy should be will give the ultimate decisions a legitimacy they often lack
under the current system. See text accompanying notes 50-57 (describing recent congressional at-
tempts to veto sale of arms to Saudi Arabia).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
15. In foreign affairs, policymaking cannot be separated from the negotiation of international
agreements; the initiation of discussions with foreign governments and the negotiation of formal and
informal agreements all constitute policy in the making. Rather than limit presidential use of unilat-
eral executive agreements, a Congress that seeks active involvement in foreign affairs should create
legislative procedures for mandatory involvement in the agreement-making process. Cf. Henkin, supra
note 7, at 306 (Congress should react to growing use of executive agreements by careful scrutiny and
use of "political weapons").
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I. THE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE BALANCE OF POWER AND ARMS
SALES
A. Constitutional Competence of Congress and the President over Arms
Sales
As in many areas of foreign policymaking, 6 both Congress and the
President can claim some constitutional power to authorize arms sales.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.'7 is often cited to support claims of
broad executive powers in foreign affairs. Language in the opinion cele-
brates the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions-a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress .. ."'8 Supporters of a strong executive role in foreign affairs
have seized on this conception and argued that the opinion confirms a
constitutionally-based general foreign affairs power for the Executive. 9
The general foreign affairs power, in tandem with article II's enumer-
ated grants of power, can be read to support the President's claim to con-
stitutional authority in the arms sales area. The commander-in-chief
clause has historically been seen to provide the Executive with wide-
ranging power over military matters even in peacetime.20 Further, the
President may derive some power in this area from the grant of general
16. The Constitution provides little guidance to Congress and the President in determining who
should manage foreign affairs beyond establishing, in the broadest of terms, the general areas in
which each branch may act. As a result, in many foreign policy areas, including trade, economic and
military aid, arms sales, emergency powers and troop deployments, strong arguments can be made for
concurrent authority. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 7 (discussing constitutional support for concurrent
authority in these areas). Historically, Congress has delegated much of its authority in these areas to
the President, thereby supporting the "steady growth of presidential power." Id. at 292; see L. HEN-
KIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrrtrrioN 37-44 (1972) (arguing that presidential practice
has resulted in broad assertions of power which, left unchallenged, have created historical precedent
for sweeping presidential power in foreign affairs); Koh, supra note 12, at 1338 (arguing that "cus-
tomary constitutional law" of executive predominance has been created in foreign affairs by congres-
sional acquiescence).
17. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
18. 299 U.S. at 320 (dictum). But see L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 45 n.18 (Sutherland's reli-
ance on John Marshall's statement that President was sole organ of federal government in foreign
affairs not historically accurate since Marshall was probably referring to presidential monopoly of
channels of communication and diplomatic apparatus).
19. See generally Koh, supra note 12, at 1308 (discussing treatment of opinion as "amendment-
analogue" to enumerated powers of Article II by courts and executive branch).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cI. 1. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 50-54 (reviewing
history of congressional acquiescence to expansive interpretation of clause); T. FRANCK & E. WEIS-
BAND, supra note 7, at 63-68 (same). Though the framers probably meant the power to be used after
a congressional declaration of war, Presidents have relied on the clause in peacetime. L. HENKIN,
supra note 16, at 53. Presidential reliance on this power has not gone unchallenged. Compare 39 Op.
Att'y Gen. 484 (1940) (President can rely on this power in arranging bases-for-destroyers deal) with
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (seizure of steel mills necessary
for producing arms in times of war cannot be sustained as exercise of commander-in-chief power) and
Note, The Arms Export Control Act and Congressional Codetermination over Arms Sales, 1 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 291, 314 n.179 (1986) (citing hearings on arms sales legislation where Con-
gressmen challenged scope of power).
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executive power in article II.21 Historically, Presidents have relied on the
aggregation of these powers to make executive agreements covering a wide
range of intergovernmental relations,2 and this power can be seen as an
additional ground for assertion of executive power in this area.2"
But ironically, given that dicta in Curtiss-Wright suggests an indepen-
dent role for the President in foreign affairs generally, the holding in the
case supports a less expansive view of the President's power in the arms
sales area. The Supreme Court found that the statute at issue in that case,
granting to the President the power to prohibit the sale of arms to certain
countries, did not contain an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power."' The holding thus concedes that Congress has a role to play in
arms sales. The Court would have been hard pressed to argue for execu-
tive independence in the making of arms sales given the strong congres-
sional claims to participate in arms sales. Congressional claims are derived
from the foreign commerce clause," the "spending power," 28 the power to
dispose of U.S. property, 27 the necessary and proper clause2" and Con-
gress' general foreign affairs power.29
Given Congress' strong textual claims to regulate arms sales, it will be
rare that a President will attempt to act on independent authority in the
area.30 Instead, the pressing question is how Congress should legislate so
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, l 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President. . . .). See
L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 43-44.
22. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 176-87 (discussing constitutionality of sole execu-
tive agreements).
23. Note, supra note 20, at 315-16.
24. 299 U.S. at 324.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The foreign commerce clause allows Congress to regulate every
aspect of trade with foreign nations, including whether or not goods, including arms, are sold at all.
See L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 70 ("The Commerce Power . . . might be sufficient to support
virtually any legislation that relates . . . to foreign relations."); see also Note, supra note 20, at 310
(same).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 1. The power to "provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare" has been read to support arms transfers because they serve American security interests. See
L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 77 & n.48; Note, supra note 20, at 311.
27. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This power may be used to justify a variety of military
transfers including the sale and transfer of arms and nuclear materials. See L. HENKIN, supra note
16, at 77; Note, supra note 20, at 310.
28. Note, supra note 20, at 310-11; see also L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 71-72, 78.
29. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.) ("Although there is in the Con-
stitution no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of
foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation.") (citing
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 318), overruled on other grounds, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967);
see also L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 68, 74-76 (Congress can claim "an unenumerated 'foreign
affairs power,' the legislative derivative of the powers of the United States inherent in its sover-
eignty."); Note, supra note 20, at 311 (same).
30. Especially given the present web of legislation providing for a congressional role in arms sales,
it would be surprising to find a President willing to authorize an overt arms sale, like Roosevelt's
destroyers-for-bases deal with Great Britain in 1941, without involving Congress. Such action would
undoubtedly lead to a hostile response from Congress, probably in the form of withheld appropria-
tions to finance the sale. See L. HENKIN, supra note 16, at 79 ("Congress can readily refuse to




as to ensure adequate scope for executive flexibility while exercising its
constitutional right to participate in decisionmaking. 1 The history of arms
sales legislation, as in many other foreign affairs areas, has been one of
successive attempts to craft statutes that allow for delegation without sac-
rificing participation in overall policy formulation.
The question of broad or narrow delegation of authority by Congress to
the President has often been determined by the values Congress wants to
maximize at a given time. The executive branch argues that diplomatic
maneuvering demands the ability to make flexible responses and credible
offers. Indeed, in each of the three arms sales "regimes" employed in the
postwar period, Congress accepted the importance of executive flexibility
and credibility by delegating broadly. However, Congress has increasingly
recognized the importance of others values, principally the need for con-
gressional oversight of executive action and congressional participation in
policymaking: in the two most recent statutory regimes it has struggled to
recalibrate the balance of power to reflect these values.
B. Arms Sales Legislation Before Chadha
The first regime, which lasted from 1949 to 1974, was characterized by
the same type of broad delegation found in most of the foreign affairs
statutes of the postwar period."2 The importance of the perception of a
strong Executive, 3 coupled with the relatively small amount of arms be-
ing exported through sales, 4 meant that executive needs for flexibility and
credibility could be satisfied at the expense of congressional participation.
In the wake of the Vietnam War, as old assumptions about the wisdom
of broad delegation in foreign affairs were challenged, members of Con-
gress saw the need to oversee and participate in foreign policymaking. 5
31. The concerns that led the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright to praise the use of broad delega-
tion in foreign affairs statutes are often referred to by the executive branch: speed, flexibility and
efficiency. 299 U.S. at 319-21. The assumption underlying this argument is that Congress cannot and
should not micromanage policy because it cannot respond quickly and efficiently to diplomatic devel-
opments. But to say that Congress only has power to "set general policy guidelines and to disapprove
particular presidential actions as inconsistent with those guidelines," Meyer, supra note 7, at 96, is to
oversimplify. This Note argues that Congress can play a more meaningful role in shaping policy,
while still preserving the ability of the executive branch to function, by putting teeth in the concept of
consultation. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
32. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-329 (1949), authorized the
President to approve military assistance and cash sales to foreign governments without congressional
approval. Madison, The Arms Sale Say-So, 12 NAT'L J. 667, 668-69 (1987). Later, with the passage
of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (1968), Congress
separated arms sales from the general foreign assistance statutes but continued the practice of broad
delegation. The 1968 Act did include reporting requirements, see, e.g., id. at § 3(a)(1), 82 Stat. at
1322 (President must report sale but report not due prior to sale), but did not provide a mode of
immediate congressional disallowance of executive action.
33. See Koh, supra note 12, at 1293 (describing presidential role in shaping postwar multilateral
political and economic order).
34. See supra note 4.
35. See generally sources cited supra note 7. Congress enacted new legislation that sought to do
more than facilitate congressional reaction to executive branch decisions. See, e.g., War Powers Reso-
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Congress passed new statutes which sought to police executive action by
use of various procedural mechanisms designed for that purpose.3 The
most powerful of these, the legislative veto, provided for unilateral con-
gressional nullification of an action taken by the executive branch under
delegated authority."7
The second regime in arms sales legislation began in 1974 when Con-
gress incorporated a legislative veto into the existing arms sales frame-
work, thereby substantially altering the balance of power between the two
political branches. Passed in the wake of President Nixon's 1972 decision
to sell weapons systems covertly to Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 8 the
Nelson-Bingham Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974"9
provided for a two-house veto 0 of reported, government-sponsored sales
in excess of $25 million."' Congress later strengthened this legislative veto
provision 2 by adding tougher reporting requirements when it passed com-
prehensive arms export control legislation in the form International Se-
curity Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).43 By
lution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982); Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1982); International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982); Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2487 (1982). The purpose was to involve Congress, through consultation and the threat of
the legislative veto, in policymaking. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 7, at 61-62 (legis-
lation meant to create "new framework of rules for power sharing" among executive and legislative
branches).
36. See supra note 12.
37. See supra note 9.
38. Though Nixon's actions were clearly a catalyst for the 1974 Amendment, other factors con-
tributed to congressional interest in the issue of conventional arms transfers, an interest comparable in
degree to the "merchants of death" inquiries of the 1930's. See Moose & Siegel, supra note 13, at
228-29. As early as 1973, legislators were proposing a reassessment of the statutory framework for
arms sales in light of the growing demand for cash sales. Id. at 229-32; see also supra note 4. Senator
Gaylord Nelson spoke for many congressmen when he voiced concern that secret arms sales would
lead to foreign commitments like those in Vietnam. Note, supra note 20, at 294 & n.17; see also T.
FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 7, at 98-100 (describing details of passage of amendment).
39. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (Nelson-Bingham Amendment), Pub. L. No. 93-559, §
45(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1795, 1814 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2776 (1982)(amended 1986)).
40. A two-house veto required that both Houses had to pass a resolution disapproving the execu-
tive action within a specified time period in order to withdraw authority for its completion.
41. The statute required that the President report all foreign military sales and provided that
Congress could disapprove of any sale by passage of a concurrent resolution in a twenty-day period
after the report had been received. The Amendment also contained a waiver provision, providing that
the President could forgo this procedure if he certified the existence of a national emergency. Note,
supra note 20, at 295.
42. This further amendment came in response to the Ford Administration's avoidance of the origi-
nal Amendment's reporting provisions. The Ford Administration had arranged the sale of a Hawk air
defense system to Jordan and only reported the planned sale to Congress at the last possible moment.
Id. at 295-96. Legislators also found the Amendment provisions inadequate in that they included a
dollar value "tripwire" that was too high, reporting provisions that allowed too little time for Con-
gressional action and limits on the legislative veto to sales, not covering transfers. Id. at 296.
43. Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified as amended 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796) (1982)
(amended 1986). The new reporting provisions in the AECA required that the President, before
issuing a government-to-government letter of offer to sell, had to submit detailed certification explain-
ing the proposed sale of "any defense articles or defense service under this Act for $25,000,000 or
more, or any major defense equipment for $7,000,000 or more." Id. at § 211, 90 Stat. 742-43. Con-
gress then had thirty days to veto the sale. Id. In addition, all non-NATO commercial sales involving
transfers of greater than $25 million would have to be processed through this procedure rather than
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1983, subsequent amendments to the AECA had expanded the legislative
veto provisions to include third-country transfers of United States arms,
commercial sales, and leases of defense equipment.44
Though no proposed arms sales were successfully challenged by a con-
current resolution, Congress was able to exert some pressure on the exec-
utive branch regarding several large sales."5 The legislative veto gave Con-
gress leverage, allowing it to threaten the executive branch with a last-
minute challenge to its negotiating credibility unless the executive branch
took consultation seriously.
Yet the legislative veto did not provide the most successful balance be-
tween the Executive's need for flexibility and credibility and Congress'
desire for oversight and participation. While allowing Congress to oversee
executive decisionmaking, Congress entered the process too late to effec-
tively influence sales decisions. The flexibility the executive branch gained
under such a scheme was also offset by the challenge to its credibility
posed by a possible congressional veto of a fully negotiated deal. What
was needed was a solution which allowed for congressional participation
earlier in the negotiation process while concurrently giving the President a
firm presence at the negotiating table.
C. Post-Chadha Changes in Arms Sales Legislation
In the third regime, stretching from the 1983 Chadha decision to the
present, Congress has not learned the lesson of the legislative veto-that
congressional participation after negotiations have been completed is inef-
fective and potentially damaging diplomatically-but has instead at-
tempted to shore up the existing legislation. Chadha, in invalidating the
legislative veto, raised the question of whether the AECA, without its leg-
islative veto provisions,4 would serve as an adequate procedural con-
straint on the President. Pursuant to Chadha's holding, 7 Congress re-
through the export licensing procedure, thereby subjecting them to a potential congressional veto. Id.
By means of a "gentlemen's agreement," Congress arranged to receive pre-notification 20 days before
a sale was formally reported, allowing 50 legislative days for consideration. T. FRANCK & E. WEIS-
BAND, supra note 7, at 103-04.
44. Note, supra note 20, at 303&enO4.
45. See 1983 House REPORT, supra note 12, at 142 (listing four times concurrent resolutions
introduced to disapprove sales); Gilmour & Craig, supra note 9, at 375 (threat of veto effectively
forced President to "make proposals more acceptable by adjusting numbers, eliminating components,
or attaching stipulations on use of the weapons"); Moose & Siegel, supra note 13, at 244 (legislators'
valued legislative veto as threat to compel executive consultation).
46. The 1986 amendment of the AECA has made the question of severability moot. For extensive
discussion of the severability question, see Note, supra note 20, at 307-10.
47. Congress held hearings on the AECA after Chadha, see, e.g., Legislative Veto: Arms Export
Control Act, Hearing on S. 1050, Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); The U.S. Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto, Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), but did not make a formal change in
the statute until 1986; see infra note 48.
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placed the concurrent resolution provisions in the AECA with joint
resolution provisions."8
These provisions, referred to as "report and wait" requirements, simply
require the President to report an arms sale and then give Congress a
period during which it can disapprove his action by the passage of a joint
resolution, which, of course, is subject to a presidential veto. The report
and wait procedure does not result in a blocked sale if one-third plus one
of the members in either House can be convinced of its value."9 Thus,
under this third legislative regime, the potential for last-minute scuttling
of negotiations, which made the legislative veto so powerful, is signifi-
cantly diminished; so too are the incentives for meaningful executive con-
sultation with Congress. The values served somewhat effectively under the
second regime are served even less well by the third regime.
The 1986 sale of arms to Saudi Arabia dramatically demonstrated this
point.5" Although a majority in both Houses of Congress voted for a reso-
lution disapproving the sale negotiated by the executive branch, the Presi-
dent was ultimately able to convince 34 Senators not to oppose his veto of
the resolution, leaving the Senate one vote short of overriding his veto. 1
In response to the Saudi sale, Senator Joseph Biden and Representative
Mel Levine recently proposed legislation which would require the execu-
tive branch to submit all major sales of sensitive weapons and equipment,
except sales to American allies, to Congress for a joint resolution of ap-
proval.5" This proposal, while overcoming the most obvious flaw in the
report and wait system, the difficulty of overriding a veto,53 does not ad-
dress the remaining problem-the lack of early congressional participation
in the decisionmaking process." Presentation of a sale after the negotia-
48. Amendment to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 99-247, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 9. Even before passage of this
amendment, the legislative veto provisions were being treated as severable and executive branch offi-
cials had explicitly agreed to continue following informal pre-notification procedures as well as statu-
tory reporting procedures. Note, supra note 20, at 317.
49. Madison, supra note 32, at 669.
50. See Note, supra note 20, at 322-25 & n.243 (describing Reagan Administration's attempts to
arrange sales to Saudi Arabia and Jordan in 1985-86).
51. Madison, supra note 32, at 669. As Senator Biden pointed out, the Saudi sale was thus
supported by only "one-sixth of the House of Representatives and one-third plus one of the Senate."
Id.
52. Id. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in March 1987, Representative
Levine described the bill as "an attempt to restore the congressional role in arms sales 'pre-Chadha',
as close as is 'constitutionally permissible.'" Id. at 670. Though the Biden-Levine proposal has been
dormant in committee since the March 1987 hearings on the bill, its sponsors maintain that they plan
to reintroduce it this year. Telephone interview with Bill Marx, Legislative Assistant to Rep. Mel
Levine (Jan. 27, 1988).
53. The President would probably not veto a sale he has submitted for approval.
54. Indeed, the assumption that Congress can only participate in policymaking after negotiations
are complete may help explain why those who claimed the legislative veto would restructure foreign
policymaking to include greater participation by Congress were wrong in assessing its projected use-
fulness. One student commentator, see Note, supra note 20, at 327, discusses the timing of congres-
sional participation, but makes an assumption inherent in the Biden-Levine proposal-that the only
choice is between a system of congressional approval or disapproval after negotiations are complete
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tions have been completed, whether for positive approval or negative chal-
lenge, does not allow for a full congressional role in policymaking.55 If
members of Congress are willing to take their constitutional responsibility
to participate in this process seriously,5" then they should look for proce-
dures that require their participation in approving the initiation as well as
the conclusion of negotiations,5" while preserving executive flexibility and
credibility. This balance has been managed with great success in the trade
area and the mechanisms employed can inform a re-evaluation of the
arms sales statutory regime.
II. THE LESSONS OF FAST-TRACK AND TRADE LEGISLATION
A. Trade Statutes as a Legislative Analogue
Trade law and arms sales law share many similar features. Trade, like
arms sales, is a foreign affairs area of concurrent constitutional authority
between the President and Congress;58 trade policy, like arms sales policy,
is ultimately determined by the agreements that structure the exchange of
goods and services. In legislating grants of authority to the executive
branch for the negotiation of trade agreements, Congress must balance the
same executive demands for flexibility and credibility with the congres-
sional desire for oversight and participation.
However, similar experimentation with various legislative regimes has
led to a different procedural structure in the trade area. Early trade legis-
(which is then of course subject to a possible presidential veto). After reviewing two controversial arms
sales and congressional responses to them, the Note concludes that Congress will act "in an ad hoc
fashion in response to specific domestic pressures" and will otherwise not want to be involved. Id. at
326-27. However, the system as it is now structured produces such a response. The writer seems
aware of this possibility when he remarks that Congress may enter the process too late to have any
effective influence. Id. at 327; see also Gilmour & Craig, supra note 9, at 375-76 (Congress can only
overcome inertia to not review sales under legislative veto system in response to domestic pressure or
media attention). Discussion should not only focus on the merits of approval versus disapproval of
executive branch action, but also on what it takes to make a congressional vote effective. This Note
rejects the efficacy of an affirmative vote after negotiations are completed by the executive branch
precisely because such a vote appears no more effective than a negative ex post vote. See id. at 384
(replacing legislative veto with joint resolution of disapproval or nonbinding concurrent resolutions
may allow Congress some leverage but will not provide "regularized participation").
55. Cf Meyer, supra note 7, at 84 (discussing development of increasingly formal consultation
procedures in foreign assistance statutes to force meaningful consultation before executive branch com-
mitments are made).
56. See Henkin, supra note 7, at 290 (framers saw Congress as "the principal 'policymaking'.
organ in foreign as in domestic affairs"); Meyer, supra note 7, at 94 (arguing that Congress should
"draw on the political legitimacy of its constitutional role" in institutionalizing its participation in
foreign affairs); see also T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 7, at 9 (willingness of individual
legislators to "devote the necessary time and attention to their new foreign policy responsibilities" as
vital to success of congressional participation in decisionmaking).
57. Cf Henkin, supra note 7, at 294-95 (Congress generally "more successful" when asserting
"breadth of its own powers" than when attempting to statutorily limit those of President).
58. See Koh, supra note 7, at 1192-93 (reviewing constitutional competence of both branches in
trade area). As in arms sales, it is unlikely that either branch will try to act independently in the trade
area because of the political consequences of such action. Id. at 1199-1200 (discussing congressional
reaction to presidential reliance on independent authority in accepting Kennedy Round trade
agreements).
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lation delegated broad advance authority to the President to negotiate
trade agreements.59 Only after passage of the Trade Expansion Act in
19620 was the President required to submit the agreements to Congress
for subsequent approval." In the 1970's, as Congress revisited the statutes
that had delegated such broad power to the President in foreign affairs,
they passed comprehensive new trade legislation, the Trade Act of 1974.11
The legislation was intended to institutionalize congressional participation
in the agreement-making process while preserving executive branch nego-
tiating flexibility and credibility at the bargaining table.13 However, in
addition to relying on the legislative veto and other tested procedural
mechanisms, 4 they incorporated a new procedure, the fast-track
guarantee.
B. The Fast-Track Guarantee in Practice
The fast-track guarantee procedure allows Congress to delegate general
negotiating authority while retaining some power to influence what is to
be conceded in negotiations. The procedure represents a bargain struck
with the executive branch: If the negotiated results meet with congres-
sional approval during a ninety-day period prior to the formal signing of
an agreement, then both Houses guarantee that any implementing legisla-
tion needed to activate the agreements will be sent through Congress on
an expedited schedule.15 Put another way, in order to secure a guarantee
of expedited treatment, the executive branch must consult with the appro-
priate congressional committees before the agreements are finalized.
Expedited treatment is assured by modifications in existing House and
Senate rules, specifically, automatic committee discharge after 45 days, no
floor amendments, and limited floor debate."6 The procedure may best be
59. See I. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 57 (1986) (delegation "protected legislators
from one-sided restrictive pressures" of their constituents, thereby allowing "successive presidents to
maintain and expand the liberal trade order").
60. Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962).
61. Koh, supra note 7, at 1197-99.
62. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1982)).
63. The legislation was meant to assure foreign negotiators that specific concessions agreed to by
American negotiators would stand a good chance of acceptance by Congress. The difficulty the execu-
tive branch faced regarding implementation of the Kennedy Round nontariff barrier agreements in the
late 1960's led some foreign governments to question the credibility of United States negotiators in
future trade negotiations. See Cassidy, Negotiating About Negotiations: The Geneva Multilateral
Trade Talks, in THE TETHERED PRESIDENCY 264, 265-66 (T. Franck ed. 1981); Jackson, United
States Law and Implementation of the Tokyo Round Negotiation, in J. JACKSON, J. Louis & M.
MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 147 & n.47 (1984).
64. See Koh, supra note 7, at 1200-08 (describing procedures in 1974 Act meant to impose
greater control on executive branch and ensure congressional participation in upcoming Tokyo Round
of multilateral trade negotations).
65. See Trade Expansion Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1982) (first fast-track legisla-
tion); Koh, supra note 7, at 1202-03 (describing provisions of legislation in detail).
66. 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1982). Expedited procedures similar to these appear in other foreign af-
fairs legislation. They are often used to allow quick consideration of resolutions of disapproval that
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described as a "bargain" because it is primarily a power-sharing mecha-
nism that is not likely to be enforced in court, but rather represents a
norm of expected conduct.87 Additionally, unlike the legislative veto, it al-
lows Congress to exert pressure on the executive branch while still meet-
ing the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment.
The procedure has worked because it meets the executive branch's need
for credibility through the promise of quick consideration of implementing
legislation; it does so in exchange for effective and ongoing consultation
with Congress, which meets the congressional goals of oversight and par-
ticipation.6 An additional reason for its success may be that there are
substantial incentives to work within the guarantee framework at all
phases of the negotiations. For example, if the President decides to negoti-
ate a trade agreement on his sole authority or has concluded negotiations
on an agreement that was initially denied expedited treatment, his only
choice would be to submit the legislation on the normal, unexpedited
track, or seek "ad hoc" fast track consideration. In essence, by negotiating
without receiving congressional approval for his initiatives, he takes the
risk that he will not be able to deliver an implementable deal.69
Further, Congress not only enhances the likelihood of effective consulta-
tion by offering fast track consideration during negotiations, but it can
continue to exert pressure for consultation by raising the threat of a re-
voked guarantee. If Congress feels the executive branch is not complying
may be proposed during a report and wait period. However, while they are often referred to as fast-
track procedures, they do not contain the "guarantee" element that characterizes the use of expedited
procedures in the trade area and thus would seem to be less effective in promoting consultation. See,
e.g., War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 7, 87 Stat. at 557-58 (1973); Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, § 211(a), 90 Stat. at 743 (motion in House for consideration of concur-
rent resolution of disapproval treated as "highly privileged" on floor); id. at § 601(b), 90 Stat. at
765-66 (Senate procedures for similar resolutions to receive limited committee consideration, limited
floor debate and no amendments); see also Meyer, supra note 7, at 84-85 (describing combination of
shortened authorization periods and expedited procedures in recent foreign aid legislation).
67. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 91-92 (discussing problem of congressional standing and judicial
reticence to enter congressional-executive disputes on management of foreign affairs).
68. The procedure worked well to facilitate implementation of the most recent multilateral trade
negotiations, the Tokyo Round agreements, and ensured that congressional concerns were considered
by American negotiators before negotiations were concluded. After President Carter gave Congress
90-day notice of his intent to sign the Tokyo Round agreements, the executive branch negotiators
consulted with the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees during that period and
received congressional approval on the pending agreements. A novel procedure was adopted during
the 90 days. Executive branch officials participated with committee representatives in sessions similar
to the "mark-up" and "conference" stages that characterize the normal legislative procedure for the
drafting of bills. Thus, the drafting of the legislation became an "interbranch process." I. DESTLER,
supra note 59, at 65; J. JACKSON, J. Louis & M. MATsusHITA, supra note 63, at 162-63. As a
result of this new procedure, Congress passed legislation necessary to implement the nine multilateral
agreements reached during the Tokyo Round negotiations in 34 legislative days. Koh, supra note 7, at
1203; see also J. JACKSON, J. Louts & M. MATSUSHITA, supra note 63, at 166 (congressional praise
for procedure clear from committee reports, legislative history and fact that it was extended by 1979
Act for eight years).
69. Of course, Congress might also decide that it favored the agreements reached and agree to
pass implementing legislation. The procedure creates incentives to produce a certain norm of conduct
but does not preempt other alternatives.
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with the procedural requirements of the guarantee or is not giving ade-
quate weight to congressional suggestions, dissatisfied legislators can "de-
rail" the fast track, revoking the guarantee at a later date for the same
reasons.7 0 Alternatively, a later Congress can always countermand the
rules adopted by an earlier Congress.71
C. Further Refinements
While Congress was attempting to cope with the loss of the legislative
veto in the arms sales area,7 it was concurrently refining the guarantee
procedure in the trade area to force executive consultation with congres-6
sional committees earlier in the negotiation process. The Trade and Tariff
Act of 198471 allows Congress to withhold a guarantee of fast-track treat-
ment for trade agreements before formal negotiations have begun . 4 Ear-
lier fast-track legislation did not require consultation with congressional
committees until the negotiations were entering their final stages.
Under this pre-negotiation procedure, if the President decides to initiate
formal negotiations with a trading partner and if the executive branch
seeks a fast-track guarantee for the negotiated agreement, then consulta-
tion with the appropriate committees is required. Members of these com-
mittees can force the President to take congressional concerns seriously by
threatening to withhold the fast-track guarantee unless certain congres-
sional concerns are addressed in the agenda for negotiation. 5 Further, the
70. Such "derailing" of expedited procedures was suggested by Congressmen unhappy with the
state of negotiations between the United States and Canada over the Free Trade Agreement. Tele-
phone Interview with Judith H. Bello, Deputy Legal Counsel, Office of the United States Trade
Representative (Jan. 28, 1988); see also Meyer, supra note 7, at 99 n.141 (expedited procedure
derailed in aid context).
71. While each House may commit itself by statute to alterations of its internal rules, the consti-
tutional authority of each house to determine the rules of its proceedings, as guaranteed by the Consti-
tution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, suggests that the procedures may be changed at a later date. See
Meyer, supra note 7, at 99 n.141 (describing "derailing" of expedited procedure by member of House
Committee on Rules by introducing another "highly privileged" resolution); Breyer, supra note 12, at
794 (future Congress might repeal expedited procedural rule if unhappy with executive action). But
see H. REP. No. 257, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983) (presenting argument that statute binds Congress
to change in rules).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 46-57.
73. Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 248, 98 Stat. 2948, 2998 (amending 19 U.S.C. §§ 1330(d)(4),
2192(a)(1)(A), 2253(c) (1982)).
74. Briefly, the legislation provides that if the President seeks to negotiate a bilateral trade agree-
ment, he must notify and consult with key congressional committees for a period of 60 legislative days
before giving the 90-day notice of his intent to sign the agreement required under the older fast-track
procedure. If neither committee disapproves of the pending negotiations or of executive objectives in
negotiating an agreement, then any negotiated agreement submitted 90 days before signing will be
eligible for fast-track consideration when submitted after signing. 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (b)(4) (1982). In
theory, the President could begin negotiations and then notify the committees 150 days before the
proposed signing date. However, the Reagan administration has chosen to construe the provision as
requiring committee consultation 60 legislative days before the commencement of formal negotiations.
Koh, supra note 7, at 1213 n.64.
75. The shift to a pre-negotiation guarantee procedure clearly magnifies the influence of the com-
mittees concerned. Even under the less restrictive fast-track procedure, these committees proved the
focus of executive branch attention. I. DESTLER, supra note 59, at 65 (citing need of executive branch
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procedure provides incentives for the executive branch to continue effective
consultation with the committees because Congress retains two chances to
disapprove the results at the post-negotiation stage: The committee in ei-
ther House can recommend disapproval of the implementing legislation
and, even if it receives approval of both committees, either House can vote
it down.
Denial of a fast-track guarantee at this stage allows Congress signifi-
cant impact on policy formulation. Disapproval by either of the two con-
gressional committees may destroy executive branch credibility before ne-
gotiations have even begun. 6 The pre-negotiation procedure clearly
makes the decision of whether to proceed with negotiations one that is
shared by the two branches. It allows Congress to participate in setting
the negotiating agenda while still preserving executive flexibility at the
bargaining table. Further, it enhances executive credibility overall because
negotiators know, broadly speaking, what concessions are acceptable to
Congress.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR ARMS SALES LEGISLATION
The fast-track guarantee provides expedited legislative treatment in ex-
change for meaningful congressional input into negotiations. Generalizing
from experience in the trade area, the procedure may prove effective in
ensuring congressional input in other foreign policy areas where three
conditions exist. First, the procedure will be most successful politically in
areas where, because of a constitutional claim to competence, Congress
can exact some price in the form of consultation in exchange for its broad
grants of authority to the executive branch. Second, the procedure can be
applied in any area where the executive branch acts through agreements
with foreign nations. Third, the executive agreements amenable to the
fast-track procedure must require some legislative action, in the form of
implementing legislation or some approval or disapproval procedure, to
take effect.
The procedure thus provides a way for Congress to police the use of
executive agreements in certain foreign affairs situations. It provides the
added benefit of assuring the President that, when he makes such execu-
tive agreements, his actions will have the support of Congress. Though a
number of foreign policy areas meet the three criteria outlined above,77
negotiators in 1979 for "the committees' overwhelming support of the agreements negotiated"). The
solution to this problem may simply be to involve more committees or provide by statute that the key
committees take into consideration the views of non-voting committees.
76. Lacking the pre-negotiation fast-track guarantee procedure, Congress could still register dis-
approval of proposed negotiations by passing a "sense of the Congress" resolution stating that it does
not agree with the substance of ongoing negotiations or that it plans to withhold implementing legisla-
tion. But it could not send such a strong and potentially devastating message to the President at the
outset of negotiations.
77. See infra Section III B.
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congressional regulation of arms sales seems a particularly appropriate
area for experimentation.
A. Making Arms Sales Legislation More Effective
When the President agrees to sell arms to a foreign government, he is
acting in an area where he shares constitutional authority to act with
Congress. The nature of arms sales requires Congress to delegate broad
authority to the executive branch to negotiate the sales arrangements. Act-
ing under this delegated authority and any independent authority he may
claim, the President then makes executive agreements in the form of offers
to sell arms packages.78 Thus, arms sales meet the first two criteria dis-
cussed above. Further, since the passage of the AECA in 1976, Congress
has required that arms sales be subject to some further congressional ac-
tion. Although the two procedures tried-the legislative veto and the re-
port and wait period-have provided only the threat of disapproval (with
the latter procedure subject to a presidential veto), the fact that negotiated
sales have been consistently brought before Congress provides the type of
legislative involvement the fast-track guarantee requires.
Under current legislation, by the time congressional acquiescence is
sought, agreement with a foreign buyer has been reached and severe dip-
lomatic repercussions may result from an ex post congressional chal-
lenge.7 Further, an ex post procedure, whether it involves necessary ap-
proval or discretionary disapproval, does not directly force the executive
branch to consult with Congress during negotiations. Thus, if legislators
are willing to take their constitutional role seriously, they should consider
adopting a pre-negotiation fast-track guarantee procedure to regulate such
transfers. Increased exercise of this responsibility may in fact redound to
the benefit of the executive branch by creating a broader legitimacy for
the arms sales that are negotiated. 0
As soon as executive branch officials decide to initiate negotiations with
a foreign buyer, they should be required to consult with appropriate con-
gressional committees, most likely the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
78. See Warnke & Luck, supra note 13, at 216-17 (describing informal negotiation process in
greater depth).
79. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 7, at 101-03 (describing King Hussein's refusal
to provide executive branch with "face saving formula" when Congress threatened legislative veto of
finalized sale in 1975). Commentators have also noted that the current disapproval system may prove
completely ineffective because individual members will not want to run the risk of embarrassing the
United States government. See Moose & Siegel, supra note 13, at 253-54.
80. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 7, at 8 ("When Congress challenges the Presi-
dent, it focuses his attention on the task of convincing the public, of 'bringing the country along.' ").
The potential benefit to the executive branch should not be underestimated. See Gilmour & Craig,
supra note 9, at 376 (President may benefit from including Congress in controversial decisions be-
cause he will not bear sole responsibility for denial of sales); T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note
7, at 105-11 (effect of increased congressional participation in arms sales in 1976-79 period has been
legitimization of sales). The executive branch will remain in control at the negotiating table, with
credibility to back up its offers, as long as it keeps Congress informed of any new developments.
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tee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs."1 The committees could
then approve the sale and guarantee that the final letter of offer would
receive fast-track consideration, or they could deny the guarantee, thereby
subjecting a submitted letter of offer to consideration under normal legis-
lative procedure. Legislators should consider requiring a joint resolution
of approval for large negotiated sales and commercial export licenses.8"
The requirement of positive approval for large sales would make denial of
a fast-track guarantee at the pre-negotiation stage potentially devastating
for the negotiations because executive branch negotiators would then have
no way to ensure the buyer that the sale would in fact be approved by
Congress. 3 However, executive branch officials, willing to adjust their
perspective agenda for the sale, might be able to convince the committees
to give a guarantee to modified proposed arms package."4
A fast-track guarantee procedure for arms sales will allow the values of
congressional oversight and participation to be met while still allowing
executive branch flexibility in arranging and implementing arms deals.8 5
Debate over specific sales should also allow both branches to address the
broader policy question of how the United States government should ap-
proach the growing demand for arms among developing countries. For
example, increased congressional participation in regulating arms trans-
81. Given the informal nature of many such discussions, it may be more difficult here than in the
trade area for Congress to specify when consultation should begin. Yet it seems clear that in the case
of either government or commercial sales, there are certain procedures that indicate the start of the
formal authorizing process. See Moose & Siegel, supra note 13, at 216-17.
82. The suggested change will necessarily increase the workload of an already overburdened Con-
gress. Madison, supra note 32, at 667; Note, supra note 20, at 327. Committee workload will in-
crease because of a need to respond to executive branch requests for fast-track consideration. Addition-
ally, once letters of offer and commercial licenses are extended, congressional approval in the form of
a joint resolution will be required for a sale to be completed. One way to limit the workload would be
to allow the executive branch to forgo the procedure for sales under a certain threshold level. Even
with a low threshold, many sales will be quickly approved as relatively non-controversial. Under the
current system, a floor vote is always a possibility because any member can typically introduce a
motion for a joint resolution. Under the fast-track system, a vote, although obligatory, is guaranteed to
take place immediately and consume a minimum amount of time.
83. The current ex post disapproval procedure could also be adapted to accommodate a fast-track
guarantee. For example, Congress could give a pre-negotiation guarantee that it would allow the
report and wait period to lapse, thereby guaranteeing that the arms deal would not encounter later
legislative obstacles. The requirement of a joint resolution of approval simply puts the burden on the
executive branch to convince Congress to support an arms deal.
84. A more radical suggestion, which would constrain the executive branch even further, would be
to revise the appropriation procedure such that Congress would not only have to approve the pending
sale but also authorize the release of funds to procure any equipment from defense contractors. This
sort of "implementing" legislation might force the executive branch to be more amenable to early
congressional input, but it would undoubtedly result in a slower and less efficient process in general.
85. Congress has traditionally included emergency waiver provisions in arms sales legislation.
Such waiver provisions allow the executive branch ample flexibility to respond to emergencies. The
waiver provisions in the AECA allows resort to the waiver in cases of "exceptional circumstances" or
when it would be "in the national interest". See Scheffer, supra note 2, at 698-713 (discussing vague
wording of waiver provision). Obviously, the vague language used in such a waiver provision provides
a potentially enormous loophole for the executive branch; in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair, such
loopholes may be addressed by Congress.
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fers may allow Congress to force executive compliance with the mandate
of sales restraint set out in the AECA. 0
B. Potential Application in Other Areas
Given that there are many foreign affairs areas where the executive and
legislative branches claim concurrent constitutional authority to make pol-
icy, the guarantee procedure may be applied in other foreign affairs legis-
lation to allow a new balance to be established between congressional par-
ticipation and executive flexibility.
There are numerous areas where Congress delegates broad authority to
the President to manage a foreign policy area and where the President
resorts to executive agreements to implement foreign policy decisions.
When executive branch officials engage in negotiation with a foreign gov-
ernment to establish a commitment for the United States to act-be it to
spend money, arrange an export license, procure goods, or send troops
abroad-the agreement and the negotiations leading up to it may well
involve an area of congressional competence, although the agreement-
making process may be informal. Further, once an agreement has been
negotiated, there are a number of ways Congress can condition actual im-
plementation on its acquiescence. In the trade area this is done through
formal implementing legislation which alters domestic law. More gener-
ally, agreements of some import, such as large arms sales or nuclear ex-
ports, may be subject to a congressional approval or disapproval period
before they become activated.
Although a thorough review of all the potential applications of the fast-
track guarantee procedure is beyond the scope of this Note, a few com-
ments can be made. The procedure should not be used to condition execu-
tive action in areas in which the President's power to act independently is
strong, such as the recognition of governments or the settlement of claims,
because the constitutional authority that supports it as a power-sharing
mechanism is lacking in these cases. Additionally, it is not likely to be
effective in those situations where the President must respond to emer-
gency situations either by making military decisions regarding troop de-
ployments or by exercising his "emergency economic powers." Finally,
certain areas, notably foreign assistance, may be ill-suited to the type of
give and take the guarantee procedure requires. Aid decisions can not be
considered negotiated; they are highly discretionary once Congress has set
86. Congress, in passing the AECA in 1976, made a strong policy declaration regarding the ex-
port of arms manufactured in the United States. See supra note 8. If in fact the majority of legislators
still feel this policy should guide executive branch initiatives, then the fast-track guarantee procedure
will provide a means for legislators to ensure that the executive branch includes the goal of general
restraint in its calculus. If this policy no longer commands majority support, the procedure can be
used to support a more aggressive executive branch stance. Whether a policy of restraint or active
sales is pursued, the procedure will provide a way to scrutinize individual sales for their contribution
to the overall goals being pursued by the United States government in this area.
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funding levels and objective standards. Consultation in this area is proba-
bly better handled by resort to a variety of other mechanisms, such as
shortened authorization periods combined with expedited procedures for
termination of aid.
87
However, statutes involving the export of weapons, nuclear materials
and sensitive technologies all typically involve agreements made with for-
eign governments and could be subject to a fast-track guarantee procedure.
Other agreements to participate in bilateral or multilateral undertakings,
such as agreements to establish or renew foreign military bases, could also
be handled under the procedure. In each case, Congress will have to assess
whether the balance established under broad delegation is preferable to
the balance established with a power-sharing mechanism like the fast-
track guarantee procedure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without the legislative veto, the statutory framework for congressional
regulation of arms sales provides little incentive for the executive branch
to consult with Congress before a sale becomes final. The fast-track guar-
antee procedure, which has been used for over a decade in trade legisla-
tion to guarantee congressional participation in trade negotiations, can be
adapted to the arms sales area. The procedure will allow Congress to
register its approval or disapproval of any potentially controversial sale
before a foreign government has been promised the arms. Further, it will
also allow Congress to better monitor executive branch compliance with
the mandate of AECA, requiring the United States government to exercise
restraint in its arms sales policy. More generally, application of the proce-
dure to the arms sales area will demonstrate its efficacy outside the trade
area and may prompt adoption of the procedure in other foreign affairs
legislation where Congress seeks to recalibrate the balance between con-
gressional participation and executive flexibility.
87. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 78-79.
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